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1
The United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken the most challenging transformation efforts in US military history. As internet technology became widely used and effective in the 1990's military visionaries began to theorize about their military application. In essence, the question was how to use information to improve combat effectiveness? The implications of these theories were widespread and revolutionary. They required sweeping changes to the way the military thought about all its functions. Because transformation is designed to question the relevance and currency of the foundational components that guide our military forces it spreads across pillars such as: doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Our military leaders have already moved down the road to transformation by planning for adaptation of cutting-edge technology and re-designing the force in to modular structures that satisfy current war-time and future operational needs. However, if transformation is to be truly successful we must seek out the gaps that exist between the top-down push for transformation and the grass roots commitment to its concepts. It would be naïve to assume that transformation will be successful no matter what the climate or culture. 2 It is basic human nature to resist change and to resent those imposing it if fundamental questions about the value of that change are left unanswered. 3 This paper addresses how transformation can be implemented effectively by understanding the cultures of those involved. Both technical and military professionals and their cultures possess the ability to facilitate transformation if they can work effectively together to create the vision of a versatile and adaptable joint force.
Our military has a deeply engrained culture, focused on providing the US with the best, most well-equipped force the world has ever seen. Field Manual (FM) 22-100 cites the importance of Army culture: "Soldiers draw strength from knowing they're a part of a tradition.
Most meaningful traditions have their roots in the institution's culture." 4 By their very nature, cultures are steeped in tradition and norms that resist unexplained change or even change that is explained, but is not understood by the very warfighters who must deal with its results.
Warfighters generally accept new equipment and find new and interesting ways to fight with it.
However, this adaptive process sometimes can take a great amount of time. One goal of the current transformation is to provide an atmosphere where change is readily accepted and adopted. This creates an environment where new systems that support our soldiers can be utilized as required to support the successful employment of our military instrument of national power. At this juncture, however, we find a clash between a desire for predictable continuity and near-term results valued by the warfighter and two issues of time -the pace of our newly emerging, fast-paced, and ever-changing world and the time it takes for the technical community to introduce and operationalize new technologies into the warfighter's arsenal. The collision of these seemingly competing concepts is where our leaders, over seven years ago, tried to catapult the U.S. military into their vision of the future and at the same time select, train and equip the current force to assure the nations super power status.
Further, a highly complex and unseen barrier resides within our technologist's cultures:
their scientists and engineers. This is a broad and varied community, full of subcultures that are difficult to understand, manage, and lead. Not only do these specialized individuals work and create in a wide variety of technology areas -each with its own lexicon and culture, but they also have differing types of technical expertise, such as engineers (computer, electrical, mechanical, etc) who like to build working objects and apply them innovatively to solve perplexing problems. Scientists also cross a gamut of similar disciplines; they like to theorize about new possibilities and devise basic, non-applied innovations. Other specialized technologists, such as software developers and computer scientists who are unique to either of these camps, add further dimensions to the space of technological cultural. They have tremendous control over the implementation of new ideas in our new information-centric world.
Much of the time these experts, despite their intellectual prowess, are underdeveloped in the interpersonal skills needed to bridge gaps among themselves and among peer cultures such as businessmen, lawyers, and military professionals.
In order to assure that DOD transformation is successful, the technical and military cultures that traditionally have remained separated must come together, sharing knowledge and understanding of each other to forge a complex relationship which spans differences in intellectual and core competencies. This integrated space will itself have many dimensions, so individuals from both sides will need an organizational climate that enables them to deliberate on the issues that are central to each other's mission areas. They must both be able to appreciate innovative and creative solutions which facilitate transformation. The concept of transformation is often misunderstood by both professional groups based on their perspectives. as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world." 6 This definition is quite ambiguous and difficult to visualize; it offers no mental models. 7 Its use of the word "process" implies a more bureaucratic approach to transformation. In fact, military transformation must always be focused on one thing -the ability for our military to fight and win our nation's wars. As such, it must focus on warfighting capability as its primary goal. But it is surely not limited strictly to weapons or material solutions. Rather, transformation affects everything needed to support soldiers, airmen, sailors and marines as they venture to fight for our country. Of course, transformation is necessary in other areas such as business practices. But to confuse warfighter-focused transformational efforts with business practice transformation is irresponsible, especially in a time of war. A better definition might simply be "change". After all, the abstract noun "transform" is derived from the verb "to transform", meaning to change. In fact, the exploding advance of information technology, the expert application of technology by our current asymmetric enemy to adapt and to exploit our weaknesses forces us to rethink the concepts of transformation as it has evolved over the last few years. We must explore the framework across the DOTMLPF seeking improvements in technology that can be readily leveraged by our military enabling them to bring all assets to the fight with minimum effort. To do this we need flexible processes and a forward-looking culture of change. In fact,
we need a better system, a system that continuously fosters innovation, creativity, and "The Navy is a prime example of the benefits of these changes … The Navy is vastly more capable, more lethal and more agile today." 13 However, this seems to be more a success based on the realities of war and more efficient ways to fight them at sea than due to new IT transformation efforts.
Numerous challenges still exist for each service as they prepare for joint operations. The services have pursued vastly different transformational initiatives. Some may be further along than others, depending on which part of the DOTMLPF they focused on first. As DOD moves more and more toward joint operations, integrated solutions that include mission requirements, planning, identified gaps will be greatly beneficial. Effective long-term acceptance of transformational principles finally relies on cultural adaptability. To create cultural adaptability we must understand the cultures of the professionals required to produce transformation and how they need to evolve.
Culture
Culture is the critical component in effective and lasting transformation. It is also the most difficult to understand and change. Many years of focused study and effort have gone into understanding culture, organizational culture, and climate. Culture has been defined in multiple ways, but for the purposes of this discussion the following two definitions seem most applicable.
Edgar H. Schein, a leading expert, defines it as "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore should be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems." 14 The Army defines organizational culture as "shared attitudes and values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution. It's deeply rooted in long held beliefs, customs, and practices." is re-enforced when, in an effort to increase the skill sets of junior officers, they are placed in highly responsible positions as a part of their professional progression, which provides a base of experience to solidify their abilities. Unfortunately, this can result in an unhealthy confidence, which causes them to believe that civilian personnel cannot possibly offer valuable input for warfighting decisions. Army FM 1 the "Can-Do" characteristics of the Army mentality: "I will always place mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. 17 " But this "Can-Do" attitude is often misinterpreted by civilians. This proactive attitude contributes initially to successful wartime efforts. But unfortunately, if this attitude carries into the requirements, planning, and budgeting process, civilian leaders often misinterpret it. They may interpret in such a way as to reduce funding for technology and systems that can be improved by technology, because the warfighters portray a confidence that they can do the job no matter what, no matter how inadequate the equipment or resources. It is the US military's job to fight and win the nations wars to the best of their ability within whatever constraints civilian leadership determines.
Each service subculture is reinforced by its traditions and focus on mission. Since the Air
Force relies on the platform -the airplane -much attention is focused on the benefits that technology offers. The Air Force leverages increases in capabilities to greatly enhance mission effectiveness. Even though human expertise remains critical to their mission, the fact is that without the airplane they cannot fulfill their mission. As a result, the Air Force must be considered a platform-centric force in which people are not the main fighting element.
Similarly, the Navy's main fighting element is the boat or ship. Again, people provide the operational expertise to effectively use the platform. But in fact the platform is the focus of the Navy's warfighting capabilities. • Different views about problem solving: Warfighers see the world from a perspective of combat. They respect the ability to fight and win battles and wars through destruction and control by highly trained "people". Technologists see the world as an endless set of challenges requiring better or new machines to solve them.
• Lifestyle: Warfighters are accustomed to tightly integrated communities, living together in small safe locations, controlled career movement, little control over centralized decisions on where they will be living, and adherence to deeply internalized values of loyalty, honor, and duty. Technologists live highly non-integrated lives, relying of freedom of ideas and movement. They depend on themselves for advancement; and they transcend boundaries in pursuit of their interests.
• Rectitude: Technologists, especially engineers, like to be right and will deny other views if they conflict with their perceived correctness. For engineers to be found wrong is a direct blow to their self-esteem and worth. They cannot separate themselves from their profession. To be wrong for an engineer is to be of no value in general. "… engineers revel in their expertise about technical matters and will not concede to other points of view." 28 Warfighters have similar morays that relate to their core competencies. They will reject new ideas if they threaten to change the status quo that they were trained on.
Military training effectively orients warfighters to believe the way they were trained is the right way and alternate approaches are suspect.
• Rigidity of world view: Because of their culture, soldiers live and work together for years always in a similar environment, so they begin to share very strong opinions which are rarely divergent. Groupthink becomes more prevalent and goes unchallenged as they discover what it takes to be accepted and get promoted. Technologists manifest a rigid worldview by virtue of their belief that their analysis must be right, so they may believe it is impossible for their view to be incorrect even in light of new data. They believe they are the best trained. They believe that, as a group they think more effectively than others. They believe they are better suited morally to assess and solve problems in their professions.
• They need successes to enhance their self-image. They work on highly complex technical problems; solutions come in the form of ideas, equations, and concepts or designs.
• Highly competitive: By their very nature as a soldier, the core competency is to fight and win. This is trained at every level. The very essence of the military is to fight and win our nation's wars. Technologists are highly competitive and derive their self-esteem and self-worth from winning self-imposed competitions. They place high value on technical achievements, on their recognition and awards. These achievements prove to them they are better than their peers. They desire to be better than their peers and want to out-do their mentors and teachers. Such competitiveness is inculcated during college and reinforced during their careers.
• Creativity: Both groups are highly creative and utilize this skill effectively to solve problems. If this creativity is harnessed in an integrated environment where everyone is seeking common goals, it can be very powerful.
• Respect: Respect often comes from recognition that another cultural group effectively accomplishes tasks that the other group would not want to carry out. Technologists do not typically want to destroy, so they are pleased someone else will provide the necessary military force when needed to protect them. Complementarily, warfighters are so focused on winning the nation's wars that they do not wish to engage in theorizing about future technological possibilities until they can be proven to be of tangible benefit.
When this occurs and they can receive a weapon that shoots farther or a sensor that provides better intelligence, they are pleased someone else provided the performance gain.
The critical juncture for effective transformation is revealed at the intersection of these two well-defined cultures. Warfighters don't always know they need a capability until they see it
working in an environment that shows marked improvement over current capability. In essence, they need to see it and feel it to be able to visualize its value. Conversely, technologists often do not know how to create this type of environment because they do not understand the culture of the warfighter or how to translate their own ideas into mental models that warfighters can quickly recognize. 29 As a result, great new technologies can often left un-utilized even though they may cost less and be more effective. Even worse, marginal technologies, possibly very expensive and less effective, are invested in and procured. Effective cultural integration can resolve these issues. Finding a new way to accomplish this integration is the true challenge in creating a more effective and transformational military instrument of national power. But solutions do exist and can be implemented to facilitate transformation.
Possible Solutions
Military personnel and technologists will work together cohesively only when they are physically placed together to achieve very focused tasks. Then they become dependent on each other for success, which becomes their shared goal. Their collaborative efforts overcome all other barriers and eventually produce measurable results as their working relationship improves and biases disappear. The skills developed by both groups placed in these circumstances will remain as a part of their professional lexicon throughout their careers and provide opportunities for clear vision as they becomes strategic leaders.
Further, integration between warfighters and technologists must start on common ground to build trust, understanding and respect. This will facilitate effective cooperation and the achievement of institutional transformation. Effective leadership and the concept of "great groups" can enable this integration. 30 In order to get these groups to integrate, an institutional effort must strongly support this. Interpersonal issues must not be ignored. The team shared an isolated work environment or laboratory in which it conducted rapid spiral experiments under high-pressure conditions. 35 The active duty personnel and most retired warfighters joined the group periodically to provide critical critique, and competing visions of the design. The engineers, designers, and software developers watched full-time along with the DARPA Program Manager (PM), off-site, and the Army Deputy PM on-site.
The team was mentored through a twelve-month architecture development process specifically designed to break existing paradigms and force creative thinking about battle command in a "Network Centric" 36 /information technology (IT) leveraging mental model. better (futuristic/integrated) tools, but was highly out-skilled by the combined experience of the world class OPFOR (red). This result is profound because it demonstrates that there is no substitute for a well trained and experienced brian. Technology still is not at a point where it can replace the human tough process when free from stress.
Organizing genius refers to two other components of great teams. "Great Groups and great leaders create each other." 38 Further, "Every Great Group has a strong leader. them from the rest…Great Groups ship…Great work is its own reward." 45 In fact, this was truly a Great Group as described in Organizing Genius.
The team was not without its share of conflict. In fact, conflict provided some of the best advances. The key was to manage conflict to provide positive outcomes. In this case, it was critical to listen to the other view, think about it and offer solutions. This process can be rapid, at other times it can be slow. But during the process, it is critical for the leader to keep all parties wanting to participate in order to sustain a stimulating and productive environment. This, of course, implies that the hardware and software must work without catastrophic failures, the experimental environment must be well controlled and the entire team must respect the leader or leaders. In this case, there were two leaders. But these two leaders were integrally linked and spoke with one voice.
The environment worked. Technical issues were resolved on site and in real time, building the confidence of the operators, analysts, and the senior mentors. The PM held periodic program reviews during which senior Army leaders would review the program and provide feedback to the PM and DPM, identifying the gaps and flaws in the experimental program. This outside view proved most helpful for the analytic side of the program. A detailed analytic methodology evolved over time, providing the richest and most insightful analytic environment ever built for understanding and measuring the effectiveness of the battle command system. The then -Army Secretary Thomas E. White said of this environment, "It is the key to the universe" 46 Ultimately, this team formed its own culture, believing they had the critical solutions to enable the future force to be a more effective fighting force.
So, why didn't this ingenious program transition effectively to the Army? Surely there were attempts made to transition products from the program across the DOTMLPF, but this was left unaccomplished. There are many reasons, but only two are pertinent for this analysis.
First, the Army had not witnessed or participated in an experimental venue such as this so it was unprepared to understand its value or fund it. It could not decide where, across the broadly separated crevices in the DOTLMPF, it made sense to place this new capability. Second, once
proper placement of the program was decided, the Army, now at war, and dealing with mounting training and operational issues clearly had higher and more pressing priorities. However, from a different cultural perspective, the real issue was that the true value of the experimentation was not appreciated in the culture of the Army or in DOD. This is where an institutional change must be made to create a culture of integrated warfighter/technology learning and innovation.
Yet, we must acknowledge that the experimental process and environment has already been created -on a small scale -in the DFAM program. The concept works exceptionally well. 47 It offers, a roadmap for how to accomplish integration of two of our nation's greatest resources, military warfighters and technologists. Our world is changing quickly not simply because of the asymmetric threats we now face, but also because the pervasive use of technology, both hardware and information management. As humans, we continue to struggle to appreciate the impact of technology on our lives. As a military, we must find a way to recognize its implications and harness its value to win our nations wars. We need to understand how to best integrate it with our human skills and abilities so we are enhanced by it. We need to do this quickly and holistically, before our enemies can exploit it. We must seize the initiative and keep it. This means we must become intellectually quick and innovate in real time. These experimental venues can help sort out ideas analytically, without having to rely on actual physical weapons systems, which are expensive to operate and hard to instrument for data collection over multiple dimensions of the DOTLMPF. However, in order to do this well we must accept failure -try and fail and try again. Such efforts will reward us in the near-and longterm. If we get it right, the long-term payoff will enable us to deter our enemies and attempt to ensure that peace is the norm throughout the world.
This approach relies on leadership: "Without leadership to verify or challenge subordinates' recommendations, problem-solving often focuses on the short term, thus deferring creative, forward-looking solutions to the next-hopefully more technically knowledgeable-commander." 48 In addition to fostering strong critical-thinking leadership, experimentation can facilitate the process of growing these critical skill sets in younger warfighters without the catastrophic effects that can occur on the battlefield. In other words, experimentation offers not only the answer to critical questions facing our military during transformation, but also creates an environment to train military participants in how to think about emerging problems and to see a bigger picture. The DFAM program illustrated this during every experiment. The warfighter participants always left the environment understanding more about tactics, battle command, and its future than prior to the experiment. Although the quote above was written about Air Force efforts in space, it is highly applicable to all the services. Experimentation also relies on leadership understanding the benefits of cultural diversity and cultural integration. "When appropriate, strategic leaders must understand and reenforce that value congruency between organizations and appreciate the potentially different perspective that both military and non-military organizations bring." 49 Experimentation brings this perspective together into a high payoff environment; it provides the US with a decisive edge from rapid innovation of ideas and concepts before bending metal. Ideas and concepts can be investigated in highly complex environments, facilitating learning and adaptation. These concepts are not limited to strategic leaders. In fact, this is precisely the ability needed in all levels of military leadership. In order to pursue this approach, we must train our DOD technologists like our military personnel to believe that: "Life in Great Groups is different from much of real life. It's better." 50 "Ultimately, our ability to rapidly adapt our doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and facilities will be the measure of our institutional agility -and clear proof of a culture of innovation." 51 The time has come to join together and overcome cultural barriers. We must mass our energies and strengths against the will of our enemies. The diversity that forms the core of our American heritage is our deepest strength for generating ideas and fostering creativity. Our military must become a constantly changing institution capable of leveraging the information explosion and all other technical emerging innovations, using them to our advantage. Three things must occur to establish and maintain flexibility and adaptability on the ever changing landscape of today's and tomorrows battlefields. First, the military (especially land forces) and the technical professions must overcome their current barriers, leading to the effective generation and integration of ideas, concepts, and ultimately solutions.
Second, the way to break the current cultural barriers is to acknowledge them and begin to train the civilian technical workforce to become more effective team members. We can accomplish this by creating training programs and establishing long standing experimentation facilities based on Great Group principles, where both technical civilians and military professionals are forced to work together to achieve measurable results. Finally, each group participating in experimentation must believe in the process. It must benefit them personally and professionally and must show ways to improve our nation's defenses.
Similar barriers have been overcome in the past, such as the shift from service components fighting wars independently to joint operations in which all the services work synergistically together towards a common goal. This paradigm shift required each service to be dependent on each other, thereby developing an appreciation for the value of each service.
Technology's impact on our world, our enemies and our military will not abate, in fact it will increase. We must build the experimental capacity and leverage its potential to continue to fight and win our nation's wars.
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